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ABSTRACT 
Retention of personnel is as important for United States 
military organizations as it is for any organization to 
ensure continuity and effectiveness.  The demands that the 
current long-term conflicts place on the military have 
affected the Navy, both Active and Reserves.  Naval 
personnel are asked to do missions on shore with ground 
units in an Individual Augmentation (IA) billet.  Many of 
these IA billets have been filled by mobilized reservists, 
particularly to the operations in Iraq (OIF) and Afghanistan 
(OEF). 
This thesis uses standard statistical modeling 
techniques to quantify the effects of these mobilizations on 
enlisted and officer retention, and in particular, 
mobilizations to certain operations, on retention.  The 
results concluded that the operation that the enlisted 
reservist was mobilized to was the most important factor in 
determining retention.  The reservist’s paygrade and rating 
were also significant factors in predicting attrition.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Retention of personnel is as important for United States 
military organizations as it is for any organization to 
ensure continuity and effectiveness.  The demands that the 
current long-term conflicts place on the military have 
affected the Navy, both Active and Reserves.  To address the 
need for troops, Naval personnel are asked to do missions, 
on shore with ground units, in an Individual Augmentation 
(IA) billet.  IA deployments for Navy personnel appear to be 
staying for the foreseeable future.  These IAs have affected 
Navy Reservists since many of them have been mobilized to 
fill these billets, particularly to the operations in Iraq 
(OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF).  Previous research has shown 
that there is a positive association between the number of 
deployments and military officer retention rates.  Other 
research has shown that there is little evidence that IA 
deployments were hurting retention rates of officers or 
enlisted Sailors. 
This thesis uses data that was gathered from the Navy 
Reserve Data Warehouse and the Naval Reserve Headquarters to 
assess the effects of mobilizations, and in particular, 
mobilizations to certain operations, on retention.  The 
results show that the operation that the enlisted reservist 
was mobilized to was the most important factor in 
determining retention in all models.  The reservist’s 
paygrade and rating were also significant factors in 
predicting attrition.  These results can help the Naval 
Reserve manage its manpower flows. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and current 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael 
Mullen, stated in 2007 his belief that Individual 
Augmentations (IAs) would continue to be part of the U.S. 
Navy’s role in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  
In his statement before the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Defense, Admiral Mullen stated the Navy 
“…was anxious to pitch in as much as we possibly can, for 
the duration of this war.  Not only can we do our share, but 
[we can] take as much stress off those who are deploying 
back-to-back…”(Navy Newsstand, 2007b).  In a statement 
before the House Armed Services committee in May 2009, the 
current CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead stated that the Navy was 
focused on today’s fight, saying:  
Our Sailors are fully engaged on the ground, in 
the air, and at sea in support of operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan…. I am thankful for the 
support of Congress for Navy Individual 
Augmentees who are providing combat support and 
combat service support for Army and Marine Corps 
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Roughead, 
2009) 
With these statements by the past and current CNOs, it 
is obvious that IA deployments will continue into the 
future.  The Navy Reserves is directly affected since many 
reservists have been mobilized to fill IA billets.  
Therefore, it is important to assess the impact of these 
mobilizations on retention. 
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Many reservists were mobilized to operations that began 
after the events of September 11, 2001.  This thesis looks 
at the effects of these reservist mobilizations (both IA and 
other) for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
specifically on the enlisted ranks.  This thesis also shows 
statistical evidence that there are lower odds of retention 
for those enlisted who are mobilized to certain operations 
for the global war on terror. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As stated by Paisant (2008), the Navy’s force policy 
integrates both the active and reserve components to meet 
the requirements in peace and in war.  This “Total Force” 
policy is in place so that the full spectrum of the 
military, and specifically the Navy, can respond to the 
demands that the nation puts upon it.  Obviously, retention 
is also important to ensure a healthy force for the future. 
To meet the force needs of Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMs) throughout the world temporarily, Individual 
Augmentation (IA) was established.  Individual Augmentation 
is a policy where a military member is temporarily assigned 
to fill in, or augment, another unit that may be outside 
their normal organization or even their branch of service.  
The Navy published an instruction that defined the policies 
and procedures of Individual Augmentation (Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, 2000).  
After the events of September 11, 2001, there was a 
challenge given to the nation’s military to address the 
terrorist threat.  Termed the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 
there were subsequent operations where there was a demand 
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for troops on the ground.  The Reserves were mobilized to 
fulfill anticipated requirements throughout the military.  
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) began a few days after the 
attacks and was followed by operations in Afghanistan (OEF) 
and Iraq (OIF). 
The Navy increasingly looked to the Reserves to meet 
the requirements that Combatant Commanders were placing upon 
it.  The majority of Sailors mobilized under IA were sent to 
Iraq and Afghanistan, but some individuals were also sent to 
the Horn of Africa or other countries in the Middle East for 
U.S. Central Command to support GWOT operations, OEF, or 
OIF.  Still others were mobilized to U.S. European Command, 
Guantanamo Bay, or even commands within the United States. 
Both active and reserve personnel may serve as 
Individual Augmentees.  As of January 2007, Rear Admiral 
Sonny Masso, then the head of Navy Personnel Command, stated 
that 82 percent of personnel who have served on an IA 
deployment were from the reserve component (Navy Newsstand, 
2007a).  Vice Admiral Ferguson III and Vice Admiral Debbink 
(2008) stated in a message that over 50,000 Reserve 
Component Sailors had been mobilized to support all of the 
operations against terrorism.  Currently, there are over 
10,000 Navy Individual Augmentees and over half of them are 
reservists (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 2010). 
Although volunteers from either the Active or Reserve 
Component can satisfy these billet requirements, reservists 
usually go through a process of mobilization to meet the 
needs of the COCOMs.  The procedures by which reservists are 
mobilized and activated into the active forces are defined 
in U.S. law as the Federal Call-Up Authority.  These 
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regulations regarding federal call up of reserve forces to 
active duty are found in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Subtitle 
E, Sections 12301-12304.  Section 12301 states that the 
Congress can call the military reserves to active duty in 
time of war or national emergency.  Section 12302 states 
that in time of national emergency declared by the 
President, up to one million members of the Ready Reserve 
(which is comprised of the Selected Reserve (SELRES), the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National 
Guard) can be called to active duty but not for more than 24 
months.  Then, Section 12304 states that the President can 
augment the active forces for operational missions.  The 
President is limited to activating 200,000 members of the 
Selected Reserve and for only 270 days before 2007 and to 
365 days for 2007 and after.  This is known as the 
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority, but 
it cannot be used for domestic emergencies (Title 10 of U.S. 
Code, 2007). 
Force planning and ensuring that adequate numbers of 
personnel are available in the Reserves requires an 
awareness of the changing factors that affect Naval 
personnel retention.  As stated by Paisant (2008), some of 
the factors that affect individuals are deployment patterns, 
external economic conditions and force demographics.  As 
also stated by Paisant and others, research has shown that 
retention behaviors vary according to gender, race, and 
other demographic factors. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous studies have been done on the effects of 
mobilization on retention.  Fricker (2002) showed a positive 
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relationship between deployment activity and retention 
rates.  Additional findings were that officers with more 
hostile deployment had higher retention rates, on average, 
than others with the same amount of non-hostile deployment.  
These findings contradicted the common belief that increased 
deployment results in lower retention rates.  This study was 
about deployments prior to the operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and therefore does not address the situation 
facing the Navy Reserves now. 
Kirby and Naftel (1998) focused on enlisted reservists 
after their service in Operation Desert Storm and Desert 
Shield in the early 1990s.  They noted that while the 
retention numbers were slightly lower for mobilized 
reservists than for non-mobilized reservists, the difference 
was not statistically significant.  That paper concluded 
that there were no adverse affects of mobilization on 
retention during these operations.  While this study was 
useful at that time, it does not address the current 
situation.  Namely, there are now much longer periods during 
which a reservist could get mobilized and the reservists 
mobilized could very well be assigned to a different service 
and doing a job different from the one for which they have 
been trained. 
Chun (2005) looked at retention of enlisted personnel 
in the Army Reserve and the National Guard.  The study 
showed a higher retention rate in the Reserves than in the 
National Guard and that there was no effect on retention 
associated with the number of deployments.  In fact, they 
found that members with one or two deployments had higher 
retention rates than those with none (Chun, 2005).  This 
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study does well to address the concerns of the Army, but not 
how the Navy Reserves might be affected with the additional 
complicating factor of individual augmentation. 
In 2006, the Congressional Budget Office did a study on 
Recruiting and Retention in the services.  In the Navy 
section, the study shows a continuation rate (the rate of 
staying in the service) in the Navy of approximately 86% and 
states an attrition rate in the Navy Reserve of 
approximately 28%.  It also shows that the continuation rate 
in the Reserves is lower than that of the Active Component.  
Although the study outlines scenarios in which the Navy and 
specifically the Navy Reserve can meet their manpower goals, 
it does not address specific issues, such as mobilizations 
and Individual Augmentations, that affect retention (Marron, 
Golding et al., 2006). 
It is also possible to compare retention rates between 
services, but this has limited value.  For example, the Air 
Force Reserve also has sent many individuals on Individual 
Augmentation for the Global War on Terror.  Its retention 
rate was over 84% for enlisted individuals for the time 
period 2004-2009 (U.S. Air Force Reserve Snapshot, 2010), 
but differences in types of missions and tasks being done 
for GWOT, plus differences in the demographics of the 
forces, make this comparison only anecdotal. 
Paisant’s (2008) study also concluded that for junior 
Naval officers there was a positive relationship between an 
IA deployment and retention.  While counterintuitive, the 
study was not able to take into account if the individual 
volunteered for the IA assignment, which would have provided 
much more insight.  Still, it was important for manpower 
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decision makers, showing that IA deployments do not increase 
junior officer loss rates.  Similarly, Fricker and Buttrey’s 
study (2008) showed little evidence that IA deployments were 
hurting active duty officer and enlisted retention rates.  
Therefore, decision makers could continue to use IAs as a 
way to fulfill Combatant Commanders’ mission needs without 
adversely affecting retention in future years. 
D. OBJECTIVE 
With the emergence of the Naval Retention Monitoring 
System (NRMS) that has been implemented on the active side 
and is scheduled for implementation on the reserve side of 
the Naval Force later this year, the entirety of the Naval 
Force will be able to monitor several factors that affect 
retention.  The Reserve Component (RC) has been always 
tasked to assist the Active Component (AC) in fulfilling the 
requirements that have been put upon the latter.  With the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the policy of Individual 
Augmentation was used to ensure combatant commanders had the 
troops needed to complete missions in their Areas of 
Responsibility (AOR).  As Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began, more 
troops were needed.  To fulfill these demands, the Reserve 
Component was asked to temporarily fill some of these 
positions.  As IA demands increased, so did the demands on 
the Navy Reserves and many reservists were mobilized to meet 
the demands of these IAs.  Because the IA program has only 
been in existence since 2000 and was made much larger after 
2001, the Navy does not have a great deal of understanding 
on how these mobilizations affect Reserve retention. 
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Data obtained from the Navy Reserves did not have 
direct information about reservists going to an IA billet, 
but it did show mobilizations.  Many reservists were 
mobilized for the operations that began after 2001, the 
majority of those mobilized going to OEF and OIF.  The 
demands of the COCOMs for these operations were mostly 
ground-unit related, and those mobilized for these 
operations would most likely be in or in direct support of 
those ground units. 
To provide further insight on retention, a study into 
the effect of mobilizations and specifically the effect of 
mobilizations for specific operations such as OIF and OEF 
proves valuable.  Additionally, demographic and rating or 
job specialty factors can be evaluated to determine if these 
factors have an effect on retention.  Reservists who were 
retained during the time period of the mobilizations to 
these operations can then be compared with those who were 
not retained, giving an analysis of these mobilizations and 
obtaining a model to assess the impact of these 
mobilizations on retention. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized in the following manner.  
Chapter II describes the data and the data sources.  It also 
explains shortcomings in the dataset.  Chapter III describes 
the methods used to evaluate retention decisions.  It also 
describes the methods by which retention was tested 
statistically.  Chapter IV provides the results of the 
statistical tests and Chapter V provides the conclusions and 
recommendations from the model.  Appendix A is a synopsis of 
officer data that was analyzed, and Appendix B describes the 
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Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Volunteer Training 
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II. DATA 
A. DATA SOURCES 
Data was collected from the Navy Reserve Data Warehouse 
on all Selected Reservists (SELRES) serving between March 
2003 and March 2010.  This data consisted of a PERS file 
(for personnel) and a LOSS file (for individuals lost), 
which was a stream of data on individuals from month to 
month.  The Reserve Data Warehouse PERS file provided rank, 
Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes, Designator codes, 
Navy Officer Billet Codes (NOBCs) and the dates of each 
individual’s mobilizations and demobilizations, if any.  The 
Reserve Data warehouse LOSS data file provided information 
on when the individual was lost from the SELRES and for what 
reason. 
Data was also obtained from the Naval Reserve 
Headquarters in Norfolk, VA.  This additional file (referred 
to as the Noble Eagle file) contained data on all reservists 
who had been mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) and 
other operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). 
Using Social Security Numbers (SSNs) as a unique 
identifier, a complete list of 148,354 individuals was 
compiled from all three sources.  There were many data 
mismatches (as might be expected in this large a data set), 
such as individuals no longer appearing in the PERS file but 
not listed in the LOSS file, and individuals listed as 
mobilized but not appearing in the Noble Eagle file.  To  
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illustrate some of the anomalies in the data, there was a 
number of mismatches in the gender of various individuals 
between datasets. 
This data was then separated into officer and enlisted 
ranks for analysis. 
B. OFFICER AND ENLISTED DATA 
Table 1 shows how the 148,354 individual records we 
analyzed were broken down into officers and enlisted.  The 
table details total numbers and percents of Naval Reservists 
mobilized, as well as numbers and percents mobilized 
specifically for OEF/OIF according to the data from the 
Naval Reserve Headquarters. 
 
Table 1.  Officer and enlisted mobilization data 










Officer  25,522  8,537  33.4% 66.6% 6593 77.2%  25.8%
Enlisted  122,832  37,050  30.2% 69.8% 29192 78.8%  23.8%
 
In Table 1, the column labeled “1+ Mob.” is the number 
of individuals who mobilized at least once in our data.  The 
“% Mob.” column is the percentage of total individuals who 
mobilized and the “% not Mob.” is the percentage of the 
total who had not mobilized.  The “# to OEF/OIF” column is 
the number of those who were classified as going to those 
operations.  The “% Mob. OEF/OIF” column shows the 
percentage of those mobilized who were mobilized to those 
operations.  The column labeled “% of Total Mob. to OIF/OEF” 
shows the percentage of all individuals that were mobilized 
to Operations OEF or OIF. 
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C. ENLISTED PERSONNEL  
Mobilization and retention of enlisted personnel was 
examined first.  It was determined which individuals had 
mobilized, the date of the end of the first mobilization was 
identified for those who had mobilized, and then it was 
determined whether the individual faced a decision to stay 
in or leave by looking at the end of obligated service date 
(EOS) for him or her. 
The individuals were separated into four categories: 
Retained, Lost, No Decision, and No End of Mobilization.  
Those who were in the Retained or Lost categories had been 
mobilized and then subsequently faced a decision to stay in 
or leave the SELRES.  Those labeled as Retained were 
individuals who extended their EOS date once they had 
returned from a mobilization.  Those labeled as Lost did not 
extend their EOS after they had returned from a 
mobilization.  Those who were in the No Decision category 
had been mobilized, but a decision to stay or go after a 
mobilization was not observed in the data.  Those in the No 
End of Mobilization category never mobilized or had not yet 
returned from their mobilization.  Figure 1 shows the number 
of enlisted personnel in each of these categories. 
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Figure 1.   Graph of numbers of enlisted categories 
In particular, Figure 1 shows that a large number of 
enlisted reservists were in the No End of Mobilization 
category. 
 The phrase “those enlisted personnel who mobilized and 
subsequently reached an EOS date or re-enlisted” is an 
unwieldy one.  Since this is the group of primary interest 
to us, we will refer to those personnel as “the Decision 
Group” since these individuals mobilized, returned and had 
to make a decision to stay or leave the Navy Reserves. 
D. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
1. Gender of Individual and Retention 
Figures 2 and 3 show the number of enlisted personnel 
by gender and the retention category by gender. 
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Figure 2.   Numbers of enlisted personnel by gender in 
data  
 
Figure 3.   Numbers of enlisted personnel by category and 
gender  
Figure 2 shows that there were approximately three 
times as many males as females in the database.  Figure 3 
shows similar trends across the four designated categories 
for both males and females.  Among those reservists who 
faced a decision (the Decision Group), the rate of females 
leaving the service was slightly higher than that of males 
(see Table 2). 
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Table 2.  Percentage of the Decision Group not retained 
broken down by gender 
Gender  Lost  Retained  % Lost 
Female  886 2,948 23.1% 
Male  4,809 16,244 22.8% 
Total  5,695 19,192 22.9% 
 
2. Race of Individual and Retention 
Retention status across four racial categories was also 
compared.  The four racial categories were Asian, White, 
Black (African-American) and the remaining aggregated into 
Other.  Figure 4 shows the total numbers of individuals in 
the data by racial group.  Figure 5 shows that the racial 
groups had similar behaviors in each designated category.  
 





Figure 5.   Percentage of individuals by category and 
racial group 
Table 3 gives the attrition percentages of the Decision 
Group, showing the percentage difference of the Asian group 
and those aggregated into the ‘Other’ group slightly higher 
than the other two categories. 
 
Table 3.  Percentage of the Decision Group not retained by 
race 
Race  Lost  Retained  % Lost 
Asian  222 646 25.6%
Black  879 2,849 23.6%
White  4,042 14,064 22.3%
Other  552 1,633 25.3%
Total  5,695 19,192 22.9%
 
3. Rank  
Figure shows the distribution of the enlisted 
individuals by rank. 
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Figure 6.   Numbers of individuals in database by rank 
Table 4 shows the number of individuals that, according 
to the data obtained from the Naval Reserve Headquarters, 
were mobilized.  The chart also includes a subset of those 
individuals who were mobilized to Operations OEF/OIF and the 
corresponding percentages, which are based upon the total 
number of individuals of that rank in our dataset. 
 
Table 4.  Numbers and percentage of individuals who were 






E1  57 5.0% 52 4.5% 
E2  204 9.9% 186 9.0% 
E3  1,187 6.6% 935 5.2% 
E4  7,340 21.2% 6,015 17.4% 
E5  15,449 39.0% 12,461 31.5% 
E6  9,333 46.4% 7,041 35.0% 
E7  2,562 48.0% 1,838 34.5% 
E8  694 47.3% 509 34.7% 
E9  224 38.5% 155 26.6% 
Total  37,050 30.2% 29,192 23.8% 
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On average, 30% of the reservists in our data have been 
mobilized.  Generally, personnel of higher ranks were 
mobilized at a higher rate.  From the table, one can also 
observe that they were correspondingly mobilized to OEF and 
OIF at a higher rate.   
Table 5 shows that, when faced with a decision (the 
Decision Group), personnel at lower ranks were most likely 
to attrite. 
 
Table 5.  Percentage of the Decision Group not retained by 
rank 
Rank  Lost  Retained  % Lost 
E1  2 6 25.0%
E2  4 7 36.4%
E3  143 166 46.3%
E4  1,614 2,579 38.5%
E5  2,393 8,040 22.9%
E6  1,141 5,987 16.0%
E7  262 1,759 13.0%
E8  99 486 16.9%
E9  37 162 18.6%
Total  5,695 19,192 22.9%
 
4. Specific Navy Ratings Within Enlisted Ranks 
Some jobs or Navy ratings were mobilized at different 
rates or in higher numbers than others.  Ratings that were 
mobilized in higher numbers were Boatswain’s Mate (BM), 
Corpsman (HM), Storekeeper (SK), Master-at-Arms (MA), 
Builder (BU) and Equipment Operator (EO). 
Table 6 is a chart of mobilization of these ratings 
compared with others within the Navy Reserves.  
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HM  4,133 8,126 33.7%
SK  2,384 4,810 33.1%
MA  2,254 4,453 33.6%
EO  2,215 3,051 42.1%
BU  2,154 3,514 38.0%
BM  2,103 4,133 33.7%
Others  21,807 57,695 27.4%
Total  37,050 85,782 30.2%
 
Table 7 shows the retention rates for the Decision 
Group with these ratings, that is, those who had come back 
from deployment and had to make a decision. 
 
Table 7.  Percentage of Losses in the Decision Group by 
specific rating 
Rating  Lost  Retained  % Lost 
HM  1,106 2,238 33.1%
SK  462 1,712 21.3%
MA  223 722 23.6%
EO  421 1,245 25.3%
BU  272 974 21.8%
BM  265 1,242 17.6%
Others  2,946 11,059 21.0%
Total  5,695 19,192 22.9%
 
The average rate of departure from the SELRES among all 
enlisted rates in the Decision Group is 22.9%, as can be 
seen from all of the tables; most of the ratings that are 
shown in Table 7 depart at that rate or lower, except for 
the Equipment Operators, Corpsmen, and Master-at-Arms.  
Also, the only other rating shown in Table 7 that is lower 
than all the other ratings aggregated in the ‘Other’ 
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category is that of Boatswain’s Mates.  Otherwise, all other 
ratings shown in Table 7 have a percentage lost rate of more 
than 21%. 
E. LOSS DATA 
The LOSS data file from the Reserve Data Warehouse 
contained data from individuals who had been lost from the 
SELRES.  The data included the individual’s SSN, Loss code 
and date of Loss.  Losses were broken down into many 
categories, including DISCHARGED, RETIRED, DIED, TRANSFER TO 
ACTIVE DUTY, TRANSFER NRPC – FORCED ATTRITION, TRANSFER TO 
IRR, and TRANSFER TO VTU, and others.  The data in the LOSS 
file did not matchup exactly with the PERS data, with some 
individuals’ data stream no longer existing in the PERS 
file, but not occurring in the LOSS file.   
Table 8 summarizes the number of Losses by operation 
type for the time period 2003-2010.  Along the vertical is 
the type of Loss, of which were selected those with the 
highest numbers and aggregating the remaining categories 
into “OTHER.” Included in those rows is the number of 
enlisted reservists that were retained.  Across the top is 
the operation mobilized to, where OEF/OIF is the aggregated 
numbers from those operations.  The other operations 
different from these two are combined, and there also is a 
column of those who were lost but did not incur a 
mobilization.  The total column shows those who were lost to 
the SELRES for that particular type of Loss.  The 
explanation of the terms IRR and VTU is in Appendix B. 
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TRANSFER TO IRR  2,562 1,293 17,546 21,401 
TRANSFER TO VTU  4,783 1,493 23,238 29,514 
DISCHARGED  3,742 1,180 16,328 21,250 
OTHER  2,411 1,313 6,277 10,001 
Total Losses  13,498 5,279 63,389 82,166 
Retained  15,694 2,579 22,393 40,666 
Total  29,192 7,858 85,782 122,832 
 
With this data, it is possible to look at the 
percentage of individuals who were lost or transferred by 
the theater to which they were mobilized.  Table 9 shows 
that information.  Since the populations are not exactly the 
same, direct comparison is not possible. 
 













Discharged  12.8% 15.0% 19.0% 17.3% 
Transfer to IRR  8.8% 16.5% 20.5% 17.4% 
Transfer to 
VTU  16.4% 19.0% 27.1% 24.0% 
Lost from 
SELRES  46.2% 67.2% 73.9% 66.9% 
 
The rows show what type of Loss and the columns 
aggregate the operations that the reservist could have been 
mobilized to.  This percentage can then be compared to the 
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column that shows the Loss percentage for that type of Loss 
over all of the enlisted Reserves.  The row labeled “Lost 
from SELRES” is the percentage of individuals no longer in 
the SELRES from the total of 122,832 enlisted individuals 
records that were in the data.  This row is then also broken 
down by operation as shown in the columns. 
F. OFFICER RANKS 
Because the officer ranks do not have EOS dates 
included in their data, we were not able to examine them in 
the same manner as the enlisted ranks and divide them into 
categories of Retained, Lost, No Decision, and No End of 
Mobilization.  It was possible to look at the raw data and 
put them into graphs and charts similar to the enlisted 
ranks.  This data is included in Appendix A for comparison, 
but because of the lack of EOS data the officers could not 
be modeled. 
G. SUMMARY 
It can be seen from the charts that from the dataset 
provided, about 30% of the enlisted were mobilized.  Of 
those that were mobilized about 79% were mobilized to either 
OEF or OIF.  Looking at those that were mobilized and then 
faced a decision to either stay in the Reserves or get out 
(the Decision Group), females got out at a slightly higher 
percentage than males.  Also, retention proportions were 
similar among racial groupings, but the Asian and ‘Other’ 
groupings had a higher attrition rate than the remaining 
racial groups. 
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Breaking down the data into paygrades, ranks of E-5 to 
E-9 were mobilized at a higher rate than were those of E-1 
to E-4.  Also those ranks of E-5 to E-9 had higher retention 
rates than those of the lower ranks of E-1 to E-4.  Looking 
at the specific ratings or job specialties of the enlisted, 
the ratings of HM, SK, MA, EO, BU, and BM mobilized in 
higher numbers and percentages than others in the data.  
Comparing the retention rates of these ratings with the rest 
of the enlisted Reserves it was found that all of them 
departed at similar rates except for those of MA, EO and HM, 
which were higher in the dataset. 
Looking at the LOSS dataset and comparing it to our 
other dataset, it could be seen also seen that most of the 
losses to the SELRES were from those discharged, or 
transferred out of the SELRES to either the IRR or the VTU.  
Comparing the percentages of those lost it can be seen that 
those who did not mobilize were lost at higher rates than 
those who did.  And those who mobilized to OEF or OIF were 
generally lower than those who mobilized to other 
operations. 
This dataset was then examined to determine if there 
was a relationship between the operation mobilized to, 
demographic factors, and the factors of paygrade and rating 
on enlisted reservist retention.  The method by which this 
was done is explained in the next chapter. 
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III. MODELING THE EFFECTS OF PARTICULAR  
MOBILIZATION OPERATIONS ON RETENTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the model used to assess the 
effects of mobilization, specifically to the operations ONE, 
OEF, OIF, and GWOT, on retention in the enlisted Reserve 
ranks.  This chapter describes the rules used to create the 
subset of data used in the analysis and the statistical 
models that were used to quantify the effects of 
mobilization on retention. 
Fricker (2002) and Fricker and Buttrey (2008) note that 
assessing the effects of deployment on retention using 
simple tabulations can be problematic since other factors 
can also affect retention.  Since mobilization in the 
Reserves is in many ways similar to active duty deployment, 
this problem applies to reservists as well.  Indeed, there 
are many reasons why an enlisted reservist may choose to 
leave or stay in the SELRES, so simply looking at raw 
attrition statistics does not provide insight to the actual 
effect or effects of mobilization. 
B. THE MODELS 
Two models were developed to analyze the data.  Only 
data from enlisted Reserve Sailors who were mobilized and 
for whom an End of Obligated Service (EOS) date was observed 




personnel could we determine whether they decided to stay or 
get out.  The two statistical modeling methods that were 
used are as follows: 
1. Tree-based Classification Model 
A tree-based classification model (classification tree) 
was developed using PASW® Modeler 13 software (SPSS Inc., 
2009).  This type of model takes the data and divides it up 
into homogeneous groups based on a categorical attribute 
variables and some outcome measure.  For this data, 
attributes we used were gender, age, paygrade, race, rating, 
and the operation for which the individual was mobilized.   
The outcome measure was either SELRES attrition or 
retention.  In the tree-based classification model groupings 
of individuals by their attributes are created that have 
similar attrition/retention rates (Breiman, 2001).  More 
discussion of how this method works can be found later in 
this chapter in section F.1. 
2. Logistic Regression Model 
A logistic regression model (see Section F.2) was also 
developed using the same attributes of gender, age, 
paygrade, race, rating, and the operation to which the 
individual was mobilized.  Logistic Regression is a good 
statistical modeling tool used to estimate the probability 
of a binary event’s occurrence. 
C. MODEL COVARIATES 
The operation that the individual was mobilized to was 
determined in the data.  If there was more than one listed, 
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the one that was listed first was taken to be the primary 
operation or theater that they were mobilized to. 
Demographic data was also used in the model, such as 
the individuals’ gender (i.e., male or female).  Race data 
was also used in the model.  With race data, the individuals 
were aggregated into four categories: White, Black, Asian 
and other. 
Rank of the individual was also used.  If there was a 
disagreement of rank between databases, the individual's 
rank that was listed in the PERS data file was used. 
The data contained Navy rating or job specialty 
combined with rank, such as SK1 (Storekeeper, First Class 
Petty Officer).  Since rank was already part of the data, 
each individual was aggregated into the enlisted reservists’ 
rating.  Ratings were then further aggregated into the major 
ratings that were mobilized in higher numbers in the 
dataset.  These were discussed in Chapter II and were 
comprised of BM, BU, EO, HM, MA, and SK. 
D. DATA CENSORING 
The mobilizations for GWOT operations started in 2001.  
As stated earlier, Operation Noble Eagle was begun in 2001 
and operations in Afghanistan started later that year.  
Operations in Iraq started in 2003.  Since our dataset began 
in 2003, all operations were underway at that point in time.  
We also were only interested in enlisted Reserve personnel 
who mobilized, returned from mobilization and then had to 
make a decision.  So those who had not been mobilized at 
all, and those who had not yet reached a decision point, 
were removed from the data.  This included personnel that 
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are still mobilized as well as those for whom the decision 
to stay or leave the SELRES is still in the future.   
E. GENERAL RULES 
We started with the initial database of monthly records 
of individuals in the SELRES, called the PERS data.  The 
data was then aggregated by SSN to produce one record for 
each individual, a total of 148,354 individual records.  The 
enlisted and officers were then separated, yielding 122,832 
enlisted records and 25,522 officer records.  These records 
were then merged by SSN to the LOSS file data and to the 
Operation Noble Eagle data, which provided information on 
mobilization.  The final subset for the model only included 
enlisted reservists who had mobilized and had faced a 
decision after mobilization to stay in or leave the SELRES.  
In our dataset this totaled 24,887 enlisted individuals.  In 
addition to the rules stated earlier, here are some 
additional criteria for the data. 
1.  The BU and EO ratings were combined into one 
category of Construction Battalion (CB) or Navy SeaBee 
category. 
2.  When an individual's gender did not agree between 
databases, the PERS database gender was used. 
F. ANALYSIS METHODS 
1. Tree-based Classification Model 
In this model, the homogeneity of a set of response 
values is measured by, for example, the binomial deviance.  
The model starts with all the data in one large group (the 
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“root node”).  Then, every possible splitting of the root 
node into two or more groups according to the values of one 
of the attribute variables is evaluated to determine the 
change in deviance associated with that splitting. (For 
example, a split might separate men from women, or age at 
EOS ≤ 24 from age at EOS ≥ 25. In either case, the deviances 
of the two subsets are computed and added.) The split 
producing the largest decrease in deviance between the root 
and the two “child nodes” is selected.  Then the process 
continues recursively with the separate splitting of the two 
child nodes until some stopping criteria are reached.  See 
Breiman (2001) for additional information about tree-based 
modeling methods. 
Several tree-based classification methods were tried to 
determine what model (i.e., which set of attributes) 
determined the best predictor of individual behavior.  We 
were looking for models that were both simple and accurate.  
The PASW® Modeler software reports the variables it deems 
most important and then subdivides the data based upon those 
attributes to determine the category that individual would 
most likely fall into (in this case, if they would stay or 
leave the SELRES). 
Every tree model includes a number of settings, among 
them a variable selection algorithm under which certain 
potential predictors may be omitted from the model.  These 
settings will also include stopping rules (more precisely, 





should stop.  It is therefore not surprising when a tree 
model selects variables different from those in another 
statistical model, like logistic regression. 
2. Logistic Regression 
As in Fricker’s (2002) model for assessing deployment 
effects on military junior officer retention, logistic 
regression was used to model retention for Navy Reserve 
enlisted personnel.  Logistic regression is a statistical 
modeling methodology used to estimate the probability of a 
binary event’s occurrence.  The method can be used to model 
the effects of many factors on retention including gender, 
race, rating, and to what operation or theater the 
individual was mobilized.  The basic form of the model is  
log(p/1-p)=β0+β1x1+…+βnxn 
where p is the probability that an enlisted reservist will 
leave and not reenlist in the Navy Reserves.  p/(1-p) is the 
odds ratio; the β’s represent the change in log odds for a 
unit change in the associated X.  The X’s represent the 
various attributes in our model, such as gender, race, 
rating, and mobilization to a specific theater or operation.  
Log odds are assumed to be a linear function of the 
independent variables.  See Devore (2009) for additional 
information about logistic regression modeling. 
The model identifies the effects that attributes, 
including mobilization to what theater or operation, have on 
the retention of an individual.  The model also quantifies 
how changes to the factors will affect Navy Reserve enlisted 
retention.  Chapter IV summarizes the results from our 
statistical methods outlined in this chapter. 
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF PARTICULAR MOBILIZATION 
OPERATIONS ON RETENTION 
This chapter quantifies the effects of mobilization of 
Navy Reserve Enlisted personnel to particular operations on 
retention, adjusting for the demographic factors of race, 
gender, paygrade, and rating.  Findings are presented and 
the overall trends are discussed.  The results of our 
statistical analysis are based on the 24,887 individuals 
contained in our data for the period 2003-2009.  Here, and 
with other statistical tests, we employ the entire set of 
population data, but we treat it as a sample for the 
purposes of assessing statistical significance. (We might 
envision a “super-population” that could generate data sets 
distributed like the one we have, one of which we have 
actually acquired.) 
A. UNIVARIATE ANALYSES 
In this section, we look at certain predictors one at a 
time and assess whether they appear to be related to the 
retention decision made by the individual.  In later 
sections we examine multiple variables simultaneously, but 
the univariate analyses can reveal important predictors and 
act as a screening mechanism.  
Table 10 compares the observed number of the Decision 
Group undergoing attrition to the number predicted under the 
hypothesis that operation is independent of outcome.  There 
were 2,913 individuals that were part of the Decision Group 
but were not listed in the data on mobilization from the 
Naval Reserve Headquarters.  These individuals were placed 
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into the Other/Unknown/Missing category.  Since the overall 
attrition rate is 22.9%, the expected attrition rate is, in 
each case, 22.9% of the number of the Decision Group.  The 
chi-squared test (Devore, 2009) evaluates the probability of 
seeing divergences between observed and expected attrition 
of the magnitude in the table, if the hypothesis were true, 
by comparing the statistic Σi (Obsi – Expi)2 / Expi to the 
critical value of the χ2 distribution with, in this case, 4 
degrees of freedom.  In Table 10, we see that the numbers of 
attritions from GWOT (with only 17 individuals, compared to 
an expected value of 151) and OIF are much smaller than 
expected, and those from ONE much higher than expected.  The 
p-value, essentially zero, leads to the rejection of the 
hypothesis of independence.  
 
Table 10.   Observed vs. Expected numbers of reservists 
attrited from the Decision Group by operation 








mob.  659  6,311 12,122 2,701 3,094 24,887 
  < 
.0001 
Expected  attrition  151  1,444 2,774 618 709 5,695   
Observed  attrition  17  1,959 1,721 1,169 829 5,695 
 
Similarly, Table 11 compares observed and expected 
attrition by paygrade, under the hypothesis that paygrade is 
independent of attrition. (We combine E1 and E2 to make 
sample sizes sufficiently large.) Since the attrition rate 
is 22.9%, that percentage is applied to each paygrade.  This 
is then compared to the actual retention numbers observed 
among the Decision Group. 
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Table 11.   Observed vs. Expected numbers of reservists 








E1/E2  5 6 < 0.0001 
E3  71 143  
E4  959 1,614  
E5  2,387 2,393  
E6  1,631 1,141  
E7  462 262  
E8  134 99  
E9  46 37  
Total  5,695 5,695  
 
As can be seen by Table 11, Decision Group attrition 
rates differ by rank.  The p-value shows that the 
probability of seeing such big differences if the hypothesis 
were true is essentially zero. 
B. TREE RESULTS 
Figure 7 shows the diagram of how the tree algorithm 
divided up the data for the enlisted reservists.  Each box 
in the diagram gives the number of individuals (n) and the 
attrition rate from the SELRES in percent.  At the top is 
the root box containing all of the enlisted reservists who 
were mobilized and were faced with a decision.  As can be 
seen, the most significant attribute that determined 
retention was the theater to which the individual was 
mobilized.  The next most important attribute was that of 
paygrade; the figure shows how for OEF and ONE the data was 
divided into paygrade groups.  The third most important 




































Figure 7.   Tree diagram of enlisted retention results 
from the Decision Group 
This model was created in PASW Modeler 13® software and 
used the C 5.0 modeling tool with the default settings.  As 
can be seen from the diagram, the Operations of ONE and OEF 
were the only ones that were set apart and all others were 
grouped together.  The algorithm showed that these two 
operations differed significantly from the others in terms 
of retention rates.  For OEF and ONE, paygrade is the next 
most important factor, with generally higher paygrades with 
lower attrition rates and subsequently higher retention.  
The final layer in the tree diagram dealt with rating for E-
4s in OEF.  Ratings were grouped based upon the numbers of 
individuals that were mobilized.  The Seabee rates of 
Equipment Operator (EO) and Builder (BU) were grouped 
together and the rates of Corpsman (HM), Master-at-Arms 
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(MA), Storekeeper (SK), and Boatswain’s Mate (BM) were 
broken out from all others.  That is, the algorithm broke 
down two operations, OEF and ONE, and one paygrade, E-4, 
into individuals who had significantly different attrition 
rates.  Those who were MAs or SKs or others had a different 
attrition rate than the Seabee rates, the HMs or BMs.   
C. LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
In the logistic regression model, all included factors 
were statistically significant.  We show our results in 
Tables 12 and 13, one showing each combination of levels and 
the other showing each level individually.  This analysis 
was done using S-plus® software (Insightful Corp., 2005). 
As seen in Table 12, the contribution of each factor is 
significant.  The LRT column refers to the likelihood ratio 
test, which is the difference between the deviance for the 
model with the factor and the deviance of the base model.  
The p-values in the next column show that these terms are 
each significant at a 5% significance level since the p-
value is less than .05 for each term.  Therefore, each group 
of factors, operation, paygrade, rating, gender and race are 
significant for the whole model. 
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Table 12.   Aggregated Factors and Contribution of 
Significance to the Model 
Term  Df  Deviance  LRT  P‐value 
Base model    24052.0    
Race  3 24062.8 10.8 0.01 
Gender  1 24061.6 9.6 < 0.01 
Rating  5 24210.6 158.6 < 0.01 
Paygrade  8 24931.9 879.9 < 0.01 
Operation  5 25646.0 1594.0 < 0.01 
 
Table 13 shows how each individual level’s contribution 
to retention compares with the baseline level.  The baseline 
terms, whose coefficients are zero, are not listed for each 
subcategory.  The baseline factors are as follows: the 
baseline gender is female, baseline rating is Boatswains 
Mate (BM), baseline race is Asian, and baseline theater is 
none (missing/unknown).  Each level’s coefficient in the 
table then shows the estimate of the effect of that level on 
the log odds of retention.  For example, the 0.487 with the 
rating of MA says that the model predicts an increase in the 
log-odds of retention for a Master-at-Arms of 0.487, 
compared to an otherwise similar Boatswain’s Mate. 
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(Intercept)  ‐ 1.463 0.854 ‐1.71
Gender (Male)  0.139 0.045 3.08
Rate  SeaBee  0.563 0.085 6.63
Rate  HM  0.698 0.081 8.59
Rate  MA  0.487 0.107 4.53
Rate  SK  0.275 0.090 3.05
Rate  Other  0.221 0.074 2.98
Race  Black  ‐0.106 0.093 ‐1.14
Race  Other  0.003 0.099 0.03
Race  White  0.044 0.086 0.51
Operation  GWOT  ‐2.581 0.250 ‐10.34
Operation  OEF  0.210 0.052 4.07
Operation  OIF  ‐0.800 0.051 ‐15.76
Operation  ONE  0.838 0.059 14.09
Operation  Other  0.097 0.176 0.55
PAYGRADE  E2  0.817 1.062 0.77
PAYGRADE  E3  1.078 0.852 1.27
PAYGRADE  E4  0.701 0.844 0.83
PAYGRADE  E5  0.018 0.844 0.02
PAYGRADE  E6  ‐0.500 0.844 ‐0.59
PAYGRADE  E7  ‐0.780 0.846 ‐0.92
PAYGRADE  E8  ‐0.492 0.851 ‐0.58
PAYGRADE  E9  ‐0.373 0.864 ‐0.43
 
What is interesting in the results is that the marginal 
rate for men staying in is lower than that for women.  
Overall, women appear to get out at a higher rate than men, 
as shown in Chapter II.  But, there may be a number of other 
factors that contribute to this.  For example, a higher 
percentage of women are in the lower paygrades such as E-3 
and E-4 than in paygrades E-7 and above; these lower 
paygrades have higher attrition rates.   
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We also looked at interaction terms for the logistic 
regression model, for instance how retention was different 
for women in OEF versus OIF or how White E-4 Boatswain’s 
Mates behaved differently than White E-4 Corpsmen.  While we 
found that many of these terms were statistically 
significant, we decided not to include them in our model for 
the sake of simplicity. 
The confusion matrix, in other statistical parlance a 
table that combines specificity and sensitivity, is shown 
for the logistic regression in Table 14.  It shows how the 
model would have predicted the individuals’ staying or 
leaving based upon the model we developed.  Rows show how 
the model would have predicted the individual, and the 
columns show the actual results.  The model used 0.5 as the 
break point; that is, individuals with predictions of 
attrition greater than 0.5 appear in the top row of the 
table and those with predictions smaller than 0.5 appear in 
the bottom one.  This model is about 78.8% accurate; that 
is, it has an error rate of 21.2%. 
 
Table 14.   Confusion Matrix of Retention, Predicted vs. 





Predict Attrited 900 486 




The operation to which an individual was mobilized is 
the most important factor in all models.  It was selected as 
the first split (that is, at the root) in the classification 
tree model, and also produced the largest decrease in 
deviance in the logistic regression. We conclude that 
attrition rates within the Decision Group vary by operation.  
Not surprisingly, there are other statistically 
significant factors that can help predict attrition.  
Paygrade was significant in the logistic regression model 
and was the second splitter on both sides of the tree model.  
Senior personnel have, on average, lower attrition rates.  
A Sailor’s rating was significant in the logistic 
regression model, although it was used only to separate a 
portion of the E-4s that went to OEF in the tree model.  
That is, these three factors kept about the same hierarchy 
of significance in the two models; first, operation 
mobilized to, then paygrade, then rating. 
It is interesting to note that Race and Gender were 
retained as predictors in the logistic regression, but not 
in the tree models.  Table 10 shows that the LRT, while 
statistically significant for those two predictors, is much 
smaller than for the other three, from which we conclude 
that the other variables are more important in predicting 
attritions.  Furthermore, the tree model selects only the 
single best predictor at each node, whereas the logistic 
regression model considers predictors globally.  So while 
Race and Gender are significant, the tree model did not 
select these predictors in its model. 
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In conclusion, while all five factors may be helpful in 
the models, operation, paygrade, and rating are particularly 
valuable in predicting attrition from the Decision Group. 
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
With the results of the statistical tests and the tree 
model, we were able to confirm our initial hypothesis that 
retention rates differed by mobilization.  However, the 
models also show a correlation with the operation to which 
the individual was mobilized, the paygrade of the 
individual, and the rating of the individual, as well as 
gender and race.  In Table 15 is the summary of the results 
found, showing attrition percentage by the operation to 
which reservists were mobilized. 
 
Table 15.   Results showing differences in percent attrition 
by operation 
Operation Mobilized to 
  GWOT  OEF  OIF  ONE  Other  Overall 
Attrition  2.6%  31.0% 14.2% 43.3% 28.7% 22.4% 
 
Table 15 shows that, overall, those who had mobilized 
once left the Reserves at a rate of 22.4%.  But that is not 
the rate across all of the operations, and as can be seen 
there is quite a difference between operations to which the 
reservists were mobilized.  Our initial expectation was that 
attrition rates would be higher for both operations OEF and 
OIF, but it turns out that attrition was higher only for 
OEF.  This observation can be used by manpower decision-
makers to further understand how their mobilization 
decisions may affect retention.  It is important to stress 
these results only show that there are differential 
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retention rates by mobilization operation.  This does not 
mean that the mobilization operation caused an increase or 
decrease in retention.  Indeed, an individual’s decision to 
reenlist or leave the SELRES is surely based on many 
factors, only one of which may be being mobilized to a 
particular operation.  It also is likely that there are a 
number of other factors, perhaps economic or family-related, 
that influence a member’s retention.  The results simply 
show that retention in the SELRES was lower for individuals 
mobilized to specific operations and in some cases for 
specific paygrades and ratings. 
It appears that mobilization procedures have improved 
over time (Ferguson & Debbink, 2008).  For example, the 
average amount of time between notification and mobilization 
has increased, and progress has been made in matching 
individuals’ skills to jobs.  There are also many rules and 
policies regarding mobilization that have changed over the 
years we studied, and which have had the effect of 
increasing the time that individuals have between 
mobilizations (unless they specifically volunteer for 
mobilization).  These policies would presumably have had an 
effect on the retention rates over the time period of our 
data and are hard to quantify. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Paisant’s study on Individual Augmentation showed that 
there was not the effect of reducing retention based upon 
doing an IA.  While we were not able to look at Individual 
Augmentation specifically, we have been able to look at a 
similar situation and conclude that there have been  
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different retention rates based upon where the individual 
was mobilized.  We are not able to observe any improvement 
or worsening of retention over time. 
Knowledge of effects of mobilizations on Naval Reserve 
officers would be of great value to a study on retention.  
Officers are critical to the overall health of any force, 
and this definitely includes the Navy Reserves.  There were 
over 25,000 officers in the data but we were unable to use 
them, since time of obligated service data was not 
available.  Data must exist on this but we did not have 
access to it. 
The Navy Reserve Data Warehouse provided loss 
information, but did not provide specific information on 
discharges from the Navy Reserves.  Information on the type 
of discharge, whether administrative, disciplinary, medical, 
or otherwise, would be of further help in determining how or 
why individuals left the service.  If this information were 
available, it would be of value to use in a follow-on 
retention study. 
The data upon which this study is based also did not 
have information on multiple deployments for those 
individuals who experienced more than one.  Rather, it only 
had the latest mobilization, and thus it could not be 
determined whether previous deployments or the number of 
deployments were associated with increased loss.  Having 
this information would have helped us better model and 
understand the effects of mobilization on retention.  
Determining specifically where and to what type of 
command an individual was mobilized would also be of value 
in a future study on retention.  Anecdotal evidence suggests 
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that individuals who were mobilized to ground units and in 
jobs where they did not have a matching skill set had lower 
satisfaction and thus potentially could have had lower 
retention.  Although Reserve Headquarters provided data for 
where the individuals were mobilized, it was difficult to 
determine where, exactly, each individual ended up.  A 
follow-on study focused on determining where and to what 
type of command an individual was mobilized would be of 
great use. 
An important area for further research would be to 
attempt to determine volunteerism for mobilizations.  It 
seems intuitive that those volunteering for mobilization 
would likely have higher retention rates.  As indicated by 
the Reserve Headquarters, this data was inconsistent, 
sometimes valid and sometimes not over different time 
periods and different sources.  Voluntary assignments not 
considered mobilizations are available for reservists.  Data 
collected on individuals who took those types of assignments 
would be a great comparison to a mobilization study. 
Retention is affected by many factors, often differing 
by individual, but also analyzable and quantifiable in the 
aggregate.  A solid understanding of these factors and their 
impact is essential to maintaining a fighting force that is 
robust enough to defend the nation.  As these factors 
continue to change over time, collecting and analyzing the 
right data is important.  The problem of retention will 
remain a significant one, ensuring that there is a healthy 




A. OFFICER DATA 
Since generally officers do not have an EOS date, we 
were not able to use the officer data in the generation of 
our model.  We provide the information here so that it can 
be used for comparison purposes to the Navy Reserve enlisted 
or some other database. 
Navy Reserve officers have varying obligations of 
service time based upon several factors.  Some examples of 
the variable length of officers’ obligation time would be if 
they came into the Reserves from the Active Component, took 
a bonus and incurred an obligation, or joined the Reserves 
directly and have a contractual obligation.  Since data of 
this type was not provided to us, it was decided not to use 
the officers in the model.  The model that was used also 
differed from Fricker and Paisant since it did not use a 
specific timeline, which was based upon training or 
obligation, for each type of individual.  The model was 
simply looking for an indication that the individual was 
mobilized and if after the mobilization he or she faced a 
decision to stay in or leave the SELRES. 
Because the officer ranks do not have EOS dates 
included in their data, we were not able to examine them in 
the same manner as the enlisted ranks and divide them into 
categories of Retained, Lost, No Decision, and No End of 
Mobilization.  It was possible, however, to examine the 
individuals and determine the same basic demographic data 
and if they were mobilized and where they were mobilized. 
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1. Sex of Officer and Mobilization 
Table 16 shows where the officers were and the 
percentage of them that went to OEF and OIF, the total, and 
the associated percentage. 
 
Table 16.   Numbers and percentage of officers mobilized to 
OEF/OIF. 
 total OEF OIF OEF/OIF % 
Male 4,480 618 587 1,205 26.9% 
female 21,042 2,005 3,383 5,388 25.6% 
total 25,522 2,623 3,970 6,593 25.8% 
 
2. Race and Mobilization of Officers 
We did the same analysis that was performed on the 
enlisted ranks for the officers.  We also used the same 
categories as the enlisted ranks.  As the results show in 
Table 17, those shown as Asian in the database were 
mobilized at a higher rate than many of the additional 
categories of race. 
 
Table 17.   Race and officer data 
 total OEF OIF OIF/OEF % going OIF/OEF 
Asian 685 75 127 202 29.5%
Black 1,272 147 196 343 27.0%
White 20,127 1,979 3,059 5,038 25.0%
other 3,438 422 588 1,010 29.4%
total 25,522 2,623 3,970 6,593 25.8%
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3. Rank and Mobilization of Officers 
Of the 25,522 individuals who were labeled as officers, 
7,750 individuals appeared to be mislabeled, but we were 
able to determine how they should be combined with the other 
data.  In this way, we were able to look at these 
individuals in the same manner as those of the enlisted 
ranks. 
 
Table 18.   Officer rank and mobilization 








O1 17 464 3.5% 16
O2 26 559 4.4% 23
O3 321 3,416 8.6% 246
O4 668 4,333 13.4% 447
O5 608 4,116 12.9% 292
O6 318 2,691 10.6% 137
O7 3 37 7.5% 2
O8 1 59 1.7% 1
O9 0 1 0.0% 0
W2 1 13 7.1% 1
W3 6 28 17.6% 2
W4 12 74 14.0% 3
Total 8,537 16,985 33.4% 6593
 
The officer mobilization rate is higher than that of 
the enlisted ranks, but of those mobilized, the officers 
were mobilized to OEF or OIF at a lower rate than that of 
the enlisted ranks. 
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B. LOSS DATA 
Using the LOSS data file, it was possible to also look 
at the officers and how they were retained in the same 
manner as it was for the enlisted reservists.  The data 
contained in the LOSS file was the same as it was for the 
enlisted and a similar chart was generated for the officers 
from 2003-2010 as was created for the enlisted reservists.  
See Appendix B for an explanation of IRR and VTU terms. 
 
Table 19.   Officer Losses by theater 
  Theater Type     
Loss 
Type   OEF/OIF Other none total 
TRANSFER TO 
IRR 711 210 4,246 5,167 
TRANSFER TO 
VTU 1,132 620 4,315 6,067 
OTHER   778 307 2,556 3,641 
Total Loss 2,621 1,137 11,117 14,875 
Retained   3,972 807 5,868 10,647 
Total   6,593 1,944 16,985 25,522 
 
Again, the data was assembled into a table of 
percentages comparing individuals who were lost or 
transferred by which theater they were mobilized to.  As 
with the enlisted data, since the populations are not 














Mobilization   
 OEF/ GWOT/ No All  
 OIF ONE/Other Mobilization SELRES 
Transfer 
to IRR 10.8% 10.8% 25.0% 20.2% 
Transfer 
to VTU 17.2% 31.9% 25.4% 23.8% 
Lost 
from 
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APPENDIX B. THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE 
(Quoted from Navy Personnel Command, 2010) 
The Navy Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a force that 
consists of personnel who must fulfill their Military 
Service Obligation under Title 10, United States Code, sec. 
651.  It also may include members fulfilling a service 
obligation incurred via contract, and those who voluntarily 
remain in the IRR after their obligation is complete.  The 
IRR is composed of the Active Status Pool and the Volunteer 
Training Unit (VTU).  Reservists in this category are 
subject to involuntary recall to Active Duty per Title 10, 
United States Code, 12301(a) and 12302. 
The Active Status Pool is a pool consisting of 
individuals who have had training and have previously served 
in the active force or in the Selected Reserves (SELRES) and 
are serving in a non-pay, and non-drill status.  
The VTU consists of personnel, organized into units, 
who are eligible and willing to return to a pay status or 
personnel not eligible for further pay assignments but who 
voluntarily drill for retirement points.  Navy Operational 
Support Centers (NOSCs), under the cognizance of the 
Commander of the Reserve Forces, are responsible for the 
continual screening and management of their attached VTUs.  
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